

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 4192

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, AO, ML

SUBJECT: A. STATE 265503; B. BAMAKO 4176

1. DCM CALLED NOVEMBER 10 ON DIRECTOR GENERAL ALIDOU TOURE OF MFA TO SEEK HOST GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF ANGOLAN SITUATION, TO GAUGE ITS AWARENESS OF CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND TO EXPRESS U.S. HOPE THAT GOM NOT MOVE HASTILY TO RECOGNIZE MPLA AS GOVT. OF ANGOLA AT TIME OF INDEPENDENCE. TOURE LISTENED CAREFULLY TO DCM'S DESCRIPTION OF SITUATION, AS CONTAINED REFTEL, AND SOWED OBVIOUS INTEREST IN POINT THAT CLAIMS OF FNLA/UNITA SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

2. TOURE CONFIRMED HIS GOVT.'S SUPPORT FOR MPLA (REF B) AND ADDED THAT THEIR INFORMATION CONCERNING INTERNAL SITUATION VAIED SOMEWHAT FROM WHAT DCM HAD RECOUNTED. TOURE THEN SAID HE APPRECIATED HEARING THE U.S. POSITION, WOULD REPORT IT TO HIS SUPERIORS AND WISHED TO EXPLAIN MALIAN POSITION. HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- MALI HAD PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED FNLA, BUT TO AVOID ENCOURAGEMENT OF AN ANGOLAN GOVT. IN EXILE, MALI HAD ALSO MADE CONTACT WITH MPLA AND UNITA.

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--MALI BECAME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER FNLA

AS REPRESENTING ONLY BAKONGO INTERESTS AND ITS GROWING DETERMINATION TO FIGHT MPLA, RATHER THAN PORTUGUESE.

--MALI CAME INCREASINGLY TO VIEW THAT ONLY MPLA WERE EFFECTIVELY FIGHTING PORTUGUESE.

--FNLA HAD BEEN GUILTY OF MASSACRE OF MPLA CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS AND HAD BECOME THE "INSTRUMENT" OF MOBUTU.

--AFTER THE FALL OF THE REGIME IN LISBON, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR MALI TO MAKE A DECISION BECAUSE PORTUGUESE OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT. MALI HAD SUPPORTED ALL ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILING THE THREE FACTIONS, BUT CONFUSION IN PORTUGAL AND ITS DESIRE ONLY TO GET OUT OF ANGOLA, HAD LED MALI TO CHOOSE MPLA.

3. TOURE EXPANDED ON RATIONALE FOR SUPPORTING MPLA BY CITING TWO ASPECTS OF MPLA POSITION: ITS "CONTROL" OF INTERIOR OF ANGOLA AND ITS POTENTIAL ABILITY TO UNIFY COUNTRY UNDER OTHER THAN TRIBAL LEADERSHIP.

4. IN REPLY TO DCM'S QUESTION, TOURE REAFFIRMED HIS GOVT'S INTENTION TO RECOGNIZE MPLA. DCM ASKED IF MALI WOULD ASSIST EFFORTS TO RECONCILE THE WARRING FACTIONS AND TOURE SAID YES, ADDING PRECISELY THAT "IF" MALI HAD ANY INFLUENCE WITH THE MPLA, MALI WOULD URGE RECONCILIATION.

5. IN A MORE INFORMAL VEIN, TOURE ALLOWED AS HOW HE HAD SERVED FOUR YEARS AS MALI'S AMBASSADOR IN CONGO, BRAZZAVILLE. HE HAD KNOWN ROBERTO AND NETO FOR YEARS AND WAS KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE SITUATION. ONLY THE MPLA, HE SAID, WAS TRULY FREE FROM EXTERNAL INFLUENCE. THE OTHER TWO WERE SUPPORTED BY THE CHINESE, THE PORTUGUESE PIDE, SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHERS. THE DCM ASKED IF THE MPLA WAS NOT ALSO RECEIVING EXTERNAL AID. TOURE SAID THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA, BUT THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THE MPLA WAS QUITE COMMUNIST END QUOTE AND WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE ALARMED.

6. TOURE WAS HIS USUAL PRECISE, COURTEOUS AND ELOQUENT
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SELF. HE TOLD THE DCM NOT TO HESITATE TO CALL HIM ON ANY MATTER AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ANGOLA AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS ANGOLA OR ANY OTHER ISSUE IN THE FUTURE.

7. CONCERNING PARA 9, REF A, RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE NEXT STEP IN OUR DIALOGUE WITH GOM, WE BELIEVE BEST APPROACH IS TO ENCOURAGE MALIAN EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE

MPLA TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO ESTABLISHING
GOVT IN ANGOLA, SINCE MALIANS WILL CERTAINLY RECOGNIZE
MPLA SHORTLY. MALIANS CANNOT OPPOSE SUCH EFFORTS AND
WOULD NOT, IN ANY EVENT, WANT TO BE SEEN AS OPPOSING
RECONCILIATION.
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